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Abstract 
This paper presents a model of innovations and economic growth, which 
departs from standard endogenous growth models by assuming that the set 
of potential projects for innovation in each period is limited. The model 
differs in a number of results from former endogenous growth models. 
First, it explains patent races, where many research teams search for the 
same potential innovation. Second, the rate of growth of the economy is 
bounded and does not rise too much with the scale of the economy. 
Namely, the model gives rise to a non-linear relationship between the size 
of the R&D sector and the rate of growth. Third, R&D is Pareto-
inefficient, as there are too many research teams searching for the same 
breakthrough. This problem increases with scale. Fourth, concentration of 
R&D by monopolistic firms is explained in this model by risk aversion.  
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Innovations, Patent Races and Endogenous Growth 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents a model of innovations and economic growth, which departs from 
standard R&D-based endogenous growth models in one single assumption.1 It assumes 
that the set of potential projects for innovation in each period is limited rather than 
unlimited, as implicitly assumed in those models. Changing this assumption leads to a 
number of interesting results. First, this model generates patent races, where many 
researchers, or research teams, search for the same potential innovation. We examine 
what happens if they search in similar ways for an innovation, or by using different 
search strategies. Second, in this model the rate of growth of the economy is bounded 
when the scale of the economy increases. Namely economic growth does not present 
strong scale effects. Third, the model predicts a non-linear relation between the amount 
of R&D and the rate of growth, where increases in R&D have a diminishing effect on 
economic growth. Fourth, R&D is Pareto-inefficient, as there are too many research 
teams searching for the same breakthrough using the same research methods. This 
problem increases with the scale of the economy. Finally, the model shows that the 
concentration of much R&D by monopolistic firms is a result of risk aversion. 
 The assumption that limits the number of potential innovations in each period is a 
very realistic assumption and touches on the essence of the innovation process. This is a 
gradual process, in which innovations follows previous innovations and need for the new 
innovations emerges after some experience with the previous ones. Thus, the inventors of 
                                                 
1 The main R&D based endogenous growth models, to which I refer in the paper, are Romer (1990), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). 
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the car could not invent the air bag immediately at the same time. Some years of 
experience with traffic problems and a growing need for safety led to it. Another example 
is the invention of talking movies, which came almost 30 years after the silent movies. 
The delay was not due to insufficient inventors, but due to gradual development of need 
and of know-how. We capture this gradual development of innovation in our assumption 
that in each period the number of potential innovations is limited. 
 The paper develops an aggregate model of economic growth through innovations 
that increase the productivity of workers. The model has overlapping generations, where 
each individual can choose whether to become a production worker or an innovator, 
when young. Each innovator (or each research team) searches for one of the potential 
innovations. If it is found, she sells its use in next period, when old. Production workers 
purchase the patent rights from the old innovators, who were successful last period. The 
size of the production sector and the size of the R&D sector are determined by 
equalization of expected lifetime utilities across sectors. 
 As the scale of the economy increases, the gains from each invention increase. It 
lures individuals to enter the R&D sector. If they could, they would search for a whole 
new potential innovation, in order to reap the full gains from innovation. This is what 
happens indeed in the standard endogenous growth models. But in this model they soon 
exhaust all potential innovations, which are limited. If the gains from successful 
innovations are very high, they might still want to search for them and enter a patent race. 
In such a race many search for the same potential innovation, and the first who finds, gets 
the patent rights. The expected gains from innovation are therefore reduced as more 
innovators enter the race, until equilibrium is reached, where the expected gains from 
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innovation are equal to gains from production.2 Thus, the first result of the model is an 
explanation of patent races. 
 Next we examine the effect of scale on economic growth. Scale increases the 
gains from innovation, which attracts more innovators. But the increase in R&D sector 
does not lead to more rapid economic growth, as the number of potential projects is 
bounded. This result is interesting for two reasons. First, it removes the strong scale 
effect of the initial R&D-based endogenous growth models, which has been in odds with 
the empirical evidence. Second, this result is related to the critique of Jones (1995) on 
R&D-based growth models, where he shows that increases in R&D in OECD countries 
did not lead to higher growth rates. This paper’s explanation to this puzzle is that much of 
the increased R&D activity was due to more participants in each patent race, without an 
increase in the number of innovations. 
 The most interesting result of this paper is that if the amount of potential 
innovations is limited, the equilibrium is inefficient, as there is too much R&D, since too 
many innovation teams search for the same innovation. This holds in the case of a single 
research strategy, but it also holds in the case of multiple research strategies. In the first 
case the result is obvious, since all competing innovators follow the same strategy, so a 
single innovator is sufficient. In the second case competing innovators can pursue 
different search strategies and increase the probability of finding the innovation. But the 
paper shows that most innovators follow the most promising strategies, while only few 
follow the less promising ones. Hence there is still too much R&D activity. 
                                                 
2 In the initial endogenous growth models the equilibrating mechanism is entry to the R&D sector that 
reduces the size of the production sector, until the gains from innovation are sufficiently low. 
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 Finally, the paper deals with the effect of risk aversion of patent races. Risk 
aversion should lead to cooperation between participants of a patent race, as they can 
share the gain from innovation and have the same expected income, but with less risk. 
While such cooperation is hard to achieve by agreement, it can emerge when a single 
firm employs all the teams that search for an innovation and it thus internalize the patent 
race. On the one hand such a firm wants to have fewer teams, in order to increase the 
gains per team, but on the other hand it needs to hire enough teams to deter potential 
competition. We show that as a result such R&D monopolies have more teams than under 
competition, so that they are less efficient. 
This paper is related to the literature of endogenous growth, which began with 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), and had a large contribution to understanding global 
economic growth. The main line in this literature has explicitly modeled the creation of 
technical progress within a macroeconomic framework of sustained growth, as in Romer 
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). These models 
have been very successful in using the increasing returns to scale of innovations to 
explain the impressive global economic growth over the recent two centuries.3 But these 
models also faced criticism, mostly because the scale effect they use has come out too 
strong. Their prediction that the rate of growth increases unboundedly with the scale of 
the economy has been in contrast with empirical evidence. As a result, a number of 
papers have refined the endogenous growth models in order to eliminate this strong scale 
effect, mainly Kortum (1997), Young (1998), Segerstrom (1998) and Howitt (1999). In a 
way, these papers share a similar assumption, namely that as technology progresses and 
                                                 
3 In the years 1820-1992 world GDP increased 40 fold, and GDP per capita increased 8 fold. US output per 
capital increased 17 fold. See Maddison (1995). 
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becomes more advanced, it becomes more difficult to create new innovations, and this 
change in the production function of innovations enables these models to have sustained 
growth without scale effects. 
This paper follows a very different route, by focusing on the gradual process of 
innovations, which cannot be invented all at the same time, but have to follow previous 
innovations, one at a time. This assumption leads the paper to a more micro-oriented 
analysis of the innovation process, which studies how innovators compete with one 
another in finding the same potential innovation, and on how they might use similar or 
different methods in their search. As a result this paper has much wider results than just 
the elimination of scale effects. It explains how patent races form, how they run, what is 
their market structure, and it examines their efficiency. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
analyzes the equilibrium in the case of a single research strategy, while Section 4 extends 
the analysis to the case of multiple research strategies. Section 5 examines the 
introduction of risk aversion and how it leads to concentration of R&D by large 
monopolies that internalize patent races. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The Model 
Consider an economy with a single final good, which is produced by many intermediate 
goods, indexed on [0, 1]. The final good is produced according to the following Kobb-
Douglas production function: 
(1)  . ∫= 1
0
,loglog djxy tjt
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The intermediate goods are produced by labor only. A worker, who uses all available 
technologies at time t, can produce an amount aj,t of intermediate good j. This 
productivity rises from one period to the other through innovations. Namely, production 
of each intermediate good goes through a process of technical change. Each innovation 
increases productivity of a worker by an amount, which is proportional to last period 
productivity, namely by ba , where b .tj ,
)bt
0> 4 Thus, if the current productivity in sector j 
is aj,t and if ij,t innovations are found in the sector in period t, the next period productivity 
will be a . 1( ,,1, ia jtjtj +=+
We next introduce the main assumption of the paper, namely that potential 
innovations are limited. Formally, we assume that the number of potential innovations in 
each sector in each period of time is finite. For simplicity, we assume that the number of 
potential innovations in each sector in each period is 1, although the results carry over for 
higher numbers as well, as can be easily shown. As a result, each sector can have at most 
one innovation in each period. Formally, ij,t can be either 1, if the innovation is found, or 
0 if it is not found. 
We next turn to describe the search for innovations, which is conducted by 
innovation teams. For simplicity we normalize the size of each innovation team to 1. A 
potential innovation is searched by a number of teams, where each can find the 
innovation, but only one finds it first. This team gets the patent rights on this innovation 
and sells its use to the producers of the intermediate good. Note, that if the set of potential 
innovations were unbounded, each innovation team would choose a different innovation 
to search for in order to increase the probability of getting the patent rights. Patent races 
                                                 
4 This proportionality assumption is common to all endogenous growth models. It reflects what is 
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of this type appear only when the set of innovations is limited. We next turn to describe 
how teams search for the potential innovation. One possible assumption is that there is 
only one way to search for the innovation, namely there is a single search strategy. In that 
case all the teams, which are searching for the innovation, follow the same search 
strategy, but only one of them gets there first. An alternative assumption is that there can 
be many different search strategies, where each has some probability of success, but only 
one is ultimately successful. The paper explores these two alternative assumptions on 
R&D and shows that they yield similar results. We call the first assumption the single 
search strategy case, and the second one the multiple search strategies case. We next 
present the assumptions on these two cases more formally. 
Single Search Strategy  
In this case all teams search similarly. The probability of finding the innovation in each 
sector is 1.5 As assumed above, only one team finds the innovation first and gets the 
patent rights. The probability of finding it first is the same for all teams. Hence, if the 
number of teams that search for the innovation in sector j in period t is nj,t the probability 
of success for each team is: 
(2)  



≥
=
=
.1if1
0fi0
,
,
,
,
tj
tj
tj
tj n
n
n
P  
Multiple Search Strategies 
In this case there are T search strategies, T , for each innovation. The probability of 
finding the innovation while using strategy s is e
∞≤
s. We order the strategies by decreasing 
                                                                                                                                                 
sometimes called the “spillover effect” of innovations: they increase productivity of future innovators. 
5 We could model search with probability of success less than 1. The results are unchanged. 
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probability of success: . The search strategies are independent of one 
another, so that the probability of finding the innovation is ∑ if Q is the set of 
strategies followed. If all strategies are followed the probability of success is 1. The 
probabilities of the different strategies can in principle vary over sectors and over time, 
but in order to simplify the presentation of the equilibrium at the steady state, we assume 
that these probabilities are the same for all sectors and for all times. Hence, we must 
further specify these probabilities to be:  for all s, , where 
. Under this specification, if an innovation is not found in period t, after using 
strategies 1,…, S, innovators can use the remaining strategies from next period on and the 
conditional probabilities of success of these strategies are going to be exactly the same as 
the original probabilities: e . Hence, the probabilities of the various 
strategies are the same, whether research on the innovation has just begun, or if it has 
been going on for some time. Let us denote the number of research teams in sector j in 
time t, which use strategy s by n
Teee >>> ...21
)1( −=s ee
∈Qs se
1)1( −−= ss eee ∞<≤ s1
10 << e
1−s
s,j,t. The success probability of such a team is: 
≥
=
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0if0
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n
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e
n
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(3)  



=,, tjsP . 
 We next turn to describe individuals in the economy. Assume that this is an 
overlapping generations economy, where individuals live two periods each. There is no 
population growth and the size of each generation is L. Individuals are assumed to be risk 
neutral, so that utility from consumption is: 
(4)  21 1
1 ccu ρ++= , 
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where c1 is consumption when young, c2 is consumption when old, and ρ is the subjective 
discount factor.6 Individuals work in first period of life only. They work either in the 
production sectors or in the R&D sector. A worker, who produces an intermediate good 
in period t, sells it in the market to earn income. If the worker uses a new innovation in 
production of the intermediate good, he pays patent fees to the patent holder, who has 
innovated it in period t-1. A member of an innovation team receives income from patent 
fees. We assume that patent rights hold one period only. Hence a team, which finds an 
innovation in period t, earns the patent fees in period t+1 in their second period of life. 
 
3. Equilibrium with a Single Search Strategy 
We begin the analysis of equilibrium with the simpler case of a single search strategy for 
each innovation. 
 
3.1 The Markets for Innovations  
Denote the market prices of the intermediate goods by pj,t, where the final good serves as 
the numeraire. Consider a sector j, in which an innovation has been found in period t-1. 
The team that has patent rights has monopoly over the innovation at t. Denote the patent 
fee paid in period t in sector j by zj,t. Workers are willing to purchase the innovation as 
long as their net income is greater or equal to their income without the innovation: 
(5)   j ap . 1,,,,, −≥− tjtjtjtjt apz
Hence, the demand for the innovation is a step function that depends on the amount of 
workers in the sector, lj,t: 
                                                 
6 This assumption is changed in Section 5, where the effect of risk aversion is analyzed.  
 9
(6)   

 −≤= −
not.if0
)(if
)( 1,,,,,,,
tjtjtjtjtj
tjtj
aapzl
zq
Hence, the monopoly patent fees are set at the maximum price and all workers purchase 
the innovation and use it. The patent fees are therefore equal to 
(7)  . bapapapz tjtjtjtjtjtjtj 1,,1,,,,, −− =−=
 
3.2. Income, Prices and Employment 
Due to free entry in first period of life the income of workers must be equal across sectors 
and that must be equal to the expected present value of income of innovators across 
sectors as well. Denote the equal income of workers across sectors in period t by wt. Then 
for every sector j, which has a new technology, a worker’s income is 
(8)  . tjtjtjt zapw ,,, −=
From (7) and (8) we get: 
(9)  . 1,, −= tjtjt apw
This holds for all sectors j, both for those with new innovations and for those without. 
Note, that as a result, the patent fee is equal to: . bwz ttj =,
 We next turn to determine the wage rate in each period. Profit maximization in 
production of the final good leads to: 
(10)  
tj
t
tj
t
tj x
y
x
yp
,,
, =∂
∂= . 
Combining (1), (9) and (10) we get: 
(11)  . ∫ −= 1
0
1,loglog djaw tjt
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Hence, if ft is the amount of sectors, which have an innovation in period t, the rate of 
change of income is 
(12)  1)1(1 −+=+ tf
t
t b
w
w
. 
 We next show how the amount of workers in each sector is determined. From 
equations (9) and (10) we get: 
(11)  
tj
tj
t
t
tj
tj
tj a
a
w
y
a
x
l
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,
,
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−== . 
Hence, if there has been an innovation in t-1 in sector j, the number of workers is 
. Since this number does not depend on j, we denote it by ltttj wbyl )1/(, += t.  If there 
has not been an innovation in sector j, the number of workers is . If 
we sum up all labor inputs in all sectors we get the overall number of workers, which is 
the total number of young individuals L minus the number of people who work in the 
R&D sector in period t, I
ttttj lbwyl )1(/, +==
t: 
(12)  . ( )111
1
0
, 1)1()1( −−− −+=−++=−=− ∫ tttttttit bfblflbfldinLIL
This equation determines the size of lt and it thus determines how many workers are in 
each sector of the economy. 
 
3.3. Determination of Innovative Activity 
We next turn to determine nj,t, namely how many teams search for the innovation in each 
sector. While the income of a worker is wt, the expected present value of the future 
income of an innovator in sector j is: 
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(13)  
tj
tjtj
n
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,
1,1, 1
1 ρ+
++ . 
From the above analysis we can tell that the future patent fee is , and that the 
expected demand for the innovation if found is l . Hence the expected income of 
an innovator in period t is: 
bwz ttj 11, ++ =
11, ++ = ttj l
(14)  
tj
tt
tj
tt
n
blwPblw
,
11
,
11 1
11 ρρ +=+
++++ . 
As long as this discounted income is higher than wt, more teams are added and nj,t 
increases, until it equals wt. If this discounted income is smaller than wt, there are no 
innovators and no R&D sector. If the discounted income equals the wage when there is 
only one team, then it is indifferent between becoming a worker or an innovator, and can 
be either. Hence, the equilibrium number of innovating teams depends on the ratio of 
incomes in the R&D sector and the production sector when there is only one team 
searching. We denote this ratio by Rt, since it is identical across sectors: 
(16)  
)1(
11
ρ+=
++
t
tt
t w
blwR . 
Hence, if , then , if , , and if  then n1>tR ttj Rn =,
≤
1<tR
1≤
0, =tjn 1=tR
I t
j,t can be either 0 
or 1. We can now calculate the overall size of the R&D sector . Note, that if 
R
∫= 10 , djn tj
1=tR
t is greater than 1, the number of R&D teams is equal across sectors, so that . If 
R
tt RI =
t is smaller than 1, there are no teams in any sector and It = 0. If , innovators enter 
only some of the sectors and 0 . tI
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 The amount of innovations across the economy in period t is therefore determined 
by the size of the R&D sector It. Clearly,  if , since in this case there is at 
most one innovator in each sector. But if  and there are more innovators in each 
sector, . We next show that in equilibrium f
tt If =
1>tI
1≤tI
1=tf t can be only 0 or 1 and there cannot be 
equilibrium with innovations in some sectors only. To see this note that Rt is equal to: 
(17)  
t
t
f
t bfb
ILbbR
t
−+
−
+
+= +−
11
)1( 11
ρ . 
Hence Rt is an increasing function of ft. Assume for the contrary that . If  
more innovators enter, f
10 << tI 1≥tR
t increases and that further increases Rt. This will continue until 
. If  innovators leave, f1>= tt RI 1≤tR t declines and that further reduces Rt. This goes 
on until no innovators are left. Hence, the only stable equilibrium outcome is either It = 1 
or It = 0. The following figure 1 demonstrates this result. The curve R represents equation 
(17), while the curve f describes how ft depends on It. If the curve R intersects with the 
horizontal axis to the right of 1, there is a unique stable equilibrium at ft = 1. If the curve 
R intersects with the curve f to the left of 1, there is a unique stable equilibrium at ft = 0. 
If the curve R is in between, as is the case in Figure 1, there are two stable equilibria, one 
at ft = 0 and the other at ft = 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
3.4. Equilibrium Dynamics 
As indicated by equation (17), the number of innovation teams in period t depends on Rt, 
which itself depends on the equilibrium in the past and in the future. Intuitively, it 
depends on past innovations, as they determine the anticipated rise in wages and it 
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depends on the number of future R&D workers, as it affect the future number of 
production workers. These intertemporal links make the dynamic analysis of equilibrium 
somewhat complex. For the dynamic analysis we introduce the following parameter: 
(18)  ρ+
+=
1
)1( bbh . 
We also introduce two threshold levels of scale: 
(19)  
h
L 10 = , 
and: 
(20)  00
2
1 1
)1(
1
1)1)(1( LL
h
b
hb
bL >−
+=−
++= ρ . 
From here on we assume that b is small enough, so that h is very small, and in particular 
we assume that . 1<h
  
Proposition 1: If , then there is no R&D in the economy. If , there is R&D 
activity and there are innovations in every sector. In this case the size of the R&D sector 
is 
0LL < 1LL >
L
h
h
+1 . The amount of inventions is 1 and the rate of growth of the economy is b. If 
the size of the economy satisfies , the invention activity can fluctuate from 0 
to 1 and back.  
10 LLL ≤≤
Proof: Consider first the case that . Note that , , and . Hence: 0LL < 11 ≤−tf 1≤tf 01 ≥+tI
  1
1
)1( <=+
+≤ hLLbbRt ρ . 
Hence,  for all j, and there is no R&D in any sector in the economy. 0, =tjn
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Next, note that we always have: , since: hLIt ≤+1
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Consider next the case that . Using the constraint on I1LL > t+1 we get: 
  1
1
)1(
111
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1
1
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Hence, there are innovators in all sectors in all periods. Hence, in every period we have 
, and the dynamic condition becomes: 11 =−tf
  . )( 1+−= tt ILhI
Since , there is a unique stable rational expectations solution to this dynamic model, 
and it is the fixed saddle solution: 
1<h
  L
h
hIt += 1 . 
As for , we do not describe the full dynamics, but since the equilibrium can 
be either 0 or 1, the economy might fluctuate between periods of full innovation and 
periods of no innovation at all.   QED. 
10 LLL ≤≤
 
3.5. R&D and Economic Growth 
Note first, that if the economy is not large enough, namely if , there is no R&D, 
there are no innovations, and there is also no economic growth. Consider next an 
economy, which is large enough to have R&D in all its sectors. In such an economy there 
is economic growth. The rate of growth of wages is equal to b. Output can be calculated 
as well and is equal to: 
0LL <
 15
(21)  . ttt wbly log)1log(loglog +++=
Since lt is fixed over time the growth rate of output, which is also equal to the growth rate 
of total factor productivity, is equal to the growth rate of wages, namely to b. The growth 
rate is therefore fixed over time, and is independent of the size of the population. 
Note, that the size of the R&D sector and the rate of growth are uncorrelated 
when the economy is growing. The size of the innovation sector increases with 
population, while the growth rate remains unchanged. Only if population is small enough, 
so that the R&D sector drops to 0, the growth rate is 0 as well. This non-linear 
relationship between growth and R&D fits well the findings of Jones (1995). 
The results of this model with respect to economic growth and R&D are both 
similar and different from the results of earlier endogenous growth models. This model 
presents a limited scale effect, since if the economy is too small there is no innovation 
activity and no economic growth, because the scale of the economy is not large enough to 
provide incentive to innovators. As the population becomes large enough, innovations 
become beneficial, innovation activity begins and with it economic growth. But 
according to this model the rate of growth does not grow with the scale of the economy, 
but remains fixed instead, since the amount of potential projects is limited. The greater 
incentives to innovation, due to a larger scale, just lead to patent races. More and more 
innovators are trying to find a limited number of potential innovations. They are doing it 
because the benefits from finding an innovation are very large. Hence, a large population 
increases the rate of growth from 0 to b, but it then remains fixed at this level whatever 
the size of the population. This result differs significantly from the strong scale effect of 
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the original endogenous growth models. It is next shown that this model differs also in its 
welfare implications. 
 
3.6. Patent Races and Pareto Efficiency 
An interesting question is whether the equilibrium described above is efficient. The fact 
that many innovation teams are looking for the same innovation, where only one team 
can find it, means that there is some misallocation of resources. To see this more formally 
consider a central planner, who allocates individuals between production and R&D (in a 
growing economy). This planner can assign only one team of innovators for each sector, 
and assign all others to work in production. The rate of growth will be the same, while 
the level of output will be larger. Hence, the equilibrium we observe is not optimal. It is 
not clear whether there is a simple policy that can Pareto-improve the allocation of 
resources in the economy, but it is obvious that subsidization of R&D works in the 
opposite direction. 
 Note that this result is drastically different from the initial endogenous growth 
models. In these models potential innovations are unbounded, hence subsidization can 
always increase R&D activity, and that raises the rate of growth and might increase 
welfare as well. This channel is blocked in our model, as the number of potential 
innovations is bounded. 
 
4. Equilibrium with Multiple Search Strategies 
In the previous section it is shown that patent races lead to significant Pareto-inefficiency, 
since too many innovators are trying to find the same innovation, using the same search 
 17
strategy. This naturally raises the question, whether these inefficiencies are reduced when 
innovators can use different strategies in order to search for the innovation. This is what 
this section examines, as it describes the equilibrium of the economy in the case of 
multiple search strategies. It is shown that in this case as well there are significant 
inefficiencies due to overcrowded patent races. Innovators tend to pursue different 
strategies in searching for the innovation, but they still tend to crowd the strategies with 
the highest success probabilities. 
In analyzing the case of multiple search strategies note that most of the analysis of 
the equilibrium in the single search strategy case carries through to this case as well. The 
market for an innovation looks the same and the innovation price is the same as well. The 
same is true for the wage level and the employment figures as well, so that all the 
equations up to (12) hold here as well. The analysis differs when we turn to discuss the 
returns from innovation, since the production function of innovations is somewhat 
different. The returns to innovation from the s strategy in each sector, relative to the 
production wage rate, are equal to: 
(22)  
tjs
s
t
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n
e
w
blw
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11
)1( ρ+
++ . 
Let us use the following notation: 
(23)  
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Then, the strategies, which are adopted for search of innovation, are those that satisfy: 
(24)  . 1,, ≥= sttjs eNn
Clearly there exists a unique strategy St such that strategies 1,…, St are adopted and less 
promising strategies, for which , are not. The amount of innovation teams 1<st eN
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declines with the probability of success, since . The more promising 
strategies draw a hot patent race, while the less promising strategies experience much 
smaller races. The total amount of innovation teams in each sector is: 
sttjs eNn =,,
S=+1 f
(25)  , tt
S
s
st
S
s
stt fNeNeNI
tt === ∑∑
== 11
where the probability of success in each sector is denoted by ft and this is also equal to 
the amount of sectors that have innovation in t. Note that Nt itself depends on the size of 
the R&D sector and on its probability of success in the following way: 
(26)  
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Together with (25) we get a complex difference equation that describes the dynamics of 
the economy. In what follows it is assumed that the economy is in a steady state and the 
analysis focuses on this steady state only. 
 At the steady state: , , and . The 
level of N determines the last search strategy adopted S. Namely S is the integer, which 
satisfies: , while .
NNN tt == +1
11 <+SNe
SS tt = fff ttt === +− 11
1≥SNe 7 The index S determines the probability of finding 
the innovation: 
(27)  . ∑
=
=
S
s
sef
1
This probability is therefore an increasing step function of N, which is bounded by 1. It is 
described by the curve PROB in Figure 2. But N also depends on this probability f, since 
the returns from innovation depend on the amount of future and past innovations. This is 
reflected in the following condition, which is derived from (25) and (26): 
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(28)  
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A simple manipulation leads to: 
(29)  
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This relationship is described in the curve RET in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The intersection of the two curves determines the steady state: how many 
strategies are adopted, and how big is the probability of success, but also how big is the 
R&D sector and what is the rate of growth of the economy. The equilibrium size of the 
R&D sector is given by: 
(30)  
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bfbLNfI f
f
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It is therefore proportional to the size of the economy. The rate of growth of the economy 
is equal to: 
(31)  1)1(
1
1 −+=−
−
− f
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 We can now analyze the effect of the scale of the economy on innovation and 
growth. If L increases the innovations become more profitable and that shifts the RET 
curve to the right. As a result more strategies are followed, more innovation teams are 
operating and more innovations are found. The economy grows at a higher rate, but this 
gain in growth rate is diminishing with scale, since the rate of growth is bounded by b. 
Hence, the result of the initial endogenous growth models, of unbounded growth rates, 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Given our specification of the series es, S is the first integer for which logNe + S log(1-e) is negative. 
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does not apply in this case as well. Note that when L is very small, so that the RET curve 
is everywhere to the left of the PROB curve, there is no innovation and both the size of 
the R&D sector and the rate of growth are 0.  
 We next discuss the Pareto-Efficiency of equilibrium. Can we say, as in the single 
search strategy case, that there are too many R&D teams and workers? Here the results 
are more mixed. On the one hand there are too many teams working on the more 
promising strategies. But on the other hand the economy can benefit from putting these 
teams to work on the marginal search strategy, to increase the chances of finding 
innovations. The real efficiency issue is therefore how to reduce the number of teams 
working on strategies 1, …, S, without reducing, or even increasing S. Note, that an 
incentive to R&D, like a subsidy, might increase S, but might also increase the amount of 
people working on all other strategies, which is inefficient. The subsidy then increases 
the rate of growth, by increasing S, but also creates efficiency losses, by reducing the 
amount of available workers in production. Clearly, as the scale of the economy 
increases, the gain from increasing S is diminishing, as the increase in probability of 
finding the innovation eS+1 becomes quite small. At the same time the loss from 
increasing the R&D sector increases as the size of this sector increases as well. Hence, 
while it might make sense to subsidize R&D at some early stage of development, where S 
is rather low, its net benefit diminishes with the scale of the economy.  
 
5. Risk Aversion and Concentration of R&D 
Our paper shows that if the global economy is large enough, there will be patent races for 
all innovations and there many innovation teams will participate in these races. In reality 
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though we observe many cases in which innovation are searched by a small number of 
competing large R&D teams and many cases where R&D is concentrate in a single 
monopoly. Interestingly our model can account for this phenomenon too, by attributing it 
to risk aversion. Assume that we change our original assumption that individual are risk 
neutral and assume instead that they are risk averse. The gains from innovation are very 
high, but the probability of success is low, due to large number of teams in each patent 
race. This creates a strong incentive for innovators to form a contract with others that 
they will share the gains from innovation if one of them finds it first. This way they can 
have the same expected income, but much smaller risk. Such arrangements cannot be 
created cooperatively, due to problems of free riding and contract enforcement, but they 
can be the outcome of a single firm, which hires many research teams to look for an 
innovation. By dividing the return from innovation between the teams, such a firm offers 
each team income above the alternative wage. This creates an incentive for this firm to 
have as few as possible teams on the one hand. But on the other hand, it has to have a 
sufficient number of teams to deter potential innovators from entering the race. Hence, 
even in this case, where the number of teams is smaller, there are still too many research 
teams, from a welfare consideration. 
 We next formalize these ideas by introducing a small change to the model. Let us 
assume that consumers are risk averse. For the sake of simplicity we assume that they 
work in second period of life only, so that utility is described by: 
(32)  , cu log=
where c is utility in second period of life. We also assume that the physical good is 
storable without depreciation, so that the real interest rate in this economy is 0 (there are 
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only lenders and no borrowers). In order to enable risk taking let us assume that in 
addition to working in first period of life (either in production or in R&D), consumers 
work in second period as well, whatever they did in first period. In the second period of 
life they are less productive, and hence they do not use the most recent technologies 
(patent fees are too expensive). Their income in second period of life, namely in period 
t+1, is therefore: 
(33)  , twα
where α  is much smaller than 1. For the sake of simplicity we describe the equilibrium 
under risk aversion for the case of single search strategy only. 
 The expected utility in this case of an R&D period t worker under a competitive 
patent race with n participants is: 
(34)  )log(1)log(11 tttt wRwn
w
n
++

 − αα . 
Note that Rt is the same as in Section 3 but with interest rate equal to 0. The expected 
utility of a production worker is: 
(35)  . ])1log[( twα+
Clearly, joining a firm that has m participants in it significantly increases utility of R&D 
workers, from (34) to: 
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 We next turn to describe the creation of a monopoly in this market. Consider a 
leading firm, which has k innovating teams searching for the innovation. On the one hand 
this firm would like k to be as small as possible, in order to have larger gains per team. 
On the other hand it wants to deter potential competitor. Let us assume that a competing 
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firm has m teams, so that the total amount of teams is n = k + m. The competing firm 
decides on its size m so as to maximize the expected utility (36): 
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The leading firm then chooses k such that the competing firm decides to stay out of the 
patent race, namely that its expected utility of its workers is smaller (or equal) than that 
of a production worker: 
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Under this condition the leading firm remains the single firm in the market and it can give 
its teams high certain income. The number of teams searching for each innovation is thus 
k, and it can be shown that it increases with the scale of the economy L as well.8 Hence, 
in this case we also have too many teams searching for the innovation, but this is done in 
order to deter potential competitors. Interestingly, by enabling internalization of the 
patent race into one firm, the number of teams within a monopoly is greater than under 
competition. The intuitive reason is that the monopoly has to deter competitor firms, who 
diversify risk, and not only individual teams.9 Hence, if firms are allowed to run a 
number of R&D teams together and become monopolies, instead of having competition 
between single innovation teams only, the R&D sector will become larger and at the 
same time more inefficient. 
                                                 
8 It can be shown that the FOC of maximization of (37) and condition (38) together with the definition of R 
in the steady state, which is b(1+b)(L-k), yield two equations in the variables m/k and k/L. The solution is 
unique and thus the share of the R&D sector in each generation k/L is fixed. Thus the size of the R&D 
sector k rises with scale L. 
9 Formally, in competition the number of competing firms is given by condition (38) when m is restricted to 
be equal to 1. Clearly, when the LHS of (38) is not maximized, it is lower and hence k can be smaller. 
Namely, if only teams are allowed to compete in patent races, these races have less teams. 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper departs from the initial R&D based endogenous growth models in one 
assumption, by assuming that the number of potential innovations in each period is 
limited. Bringing more innovators in a period of time cannot lead to more innovations 
necessarily, as some take time and take prior innovations to build on. It is shown that 
changing this assumption changes the results of the model quite significantly. Some of 
the changes lead to results that fit better the historical evidence of growth rates and the 
size of R&D activity. Thus, growth rates do not rise unboundedly with the size of the 
economy, and also the relation between the growth rate and the size of the R&D sector is 
not simplistically positive. 
 But the main deviation of the paper from the initial R&D based endogenous 
growth literature is that it leads to patent races, both between innovating firms and within 
innovating firms. The limited number of potential projects leads innovators to join others, 
who already search for an innovation, and creates a patent race. This leads to some waste 
in resources and is clearly sub-optimal. The paper shows that this is true even if there are 
many different strategies to search for the same potential innovation. Even then searchers 
use different strategies, but they tend to crowd more the promising strategies, which offer 
a higher probability of success. Thus, there is still some inefficiency in this case as well. 
 We stop short of offering policy recommendations. Mostly because any general 
measure with respect to innovation activity, like subsidy, has a number of effects on 
growth. On the one hand a subsidy might increase the probability of finding innovations 
and can increase the rate of growth, though with diminishing success, if the scale of the 
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economy is large. On the other hand, it increases incentives to innovators to join patent 
races, which already have too many participants, and that increase inefficiency. The ideal 
policy could be to support those innovators who travel the less frequented ways, namely 
those who try the strategies with the lowest probabilities of success. Hence, this model 
suggests that research incentives should be given to those who deviate from the crowd 
and who are doing less standard and more risky research. 
 
 26
References 
Aghion, Philippe and Howitt, Peter. “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction,” 
Econometrica, Vol. 60 (2), March 1992, p. 323-351. 
 
------. Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. 
 
Barro, Robert J., and Sala-i-Martin, Xavier. Economic Growth. New York: McGraw Hill, 
1995. 
 
Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan. Innovation and Growth in the Global 
Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. 
 
Howitt, Peter. “Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R & D Inputs Growing,” 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107 (4), August 1999, p. 715-730. 
 
Jones, Charles I. “R & D-Based Models of Economic Growth,” Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 103, August, 1995, p. 759-784. 
 
Kortum, Samuel. “Research, Patenting, and Technological Change,” Econometrica, Vol. 
65 (6), November 1997, p. 450-457. 
 
Lucas, R.E. Jr. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary  
Economics, Vol. 22, July 1988, p. 3-42. 
 
Madison, Angus. Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992. Paris, France: Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995.  
 
Romer, P.M. “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 94, 1986, p. 1002-1037. 
 
------. “Endogenous Technical Change,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 (5, pt.2), 
October 1990, p. S71-S102. 
 
Segerstrom, Paul S. “Endogenous Growth without Scale Effects,” The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 88 (2), December 1998, p. 1290-1310. 
 
Young, Alwyn. “Growth without Scale Effects,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106 
(2), February 1998, p. 41-63. 
 
 27
Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
ft  
f 
R 
Rt, It 
 
 
 
 
1  
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
  
 
 
 
f 
PROB 
RET 
N 
 
 
 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29
